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Among the most important issues for American national
security is the national response to the growing threat from cyber
activities. This threat is both ubiquitous and potentially
catastrophic. It will force the United States, and the entire world,
to reevaluate the way in which nations think of both national
security and the concept of armed conflict. To combat this threat,
President Obama must refocus America's attention by both
reallocating the primary governmental responsibility for cyber
security from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the
Department of Defense (DOD) and overhauling the public-private
partnership that he has made a key component of his cyber
strategy.
I. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CYBER EMPHASIS
Beginning with President Clinton in 1996 and continuing
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through President George W. Bush to President Obama, the
executive branch has taken the lead on securing the nation from
cyber threats but has focused its efforts mainly on government
computers and systems.' Shortly after entering office, President
Obama embarked on a potentially new and expanded view when
he called for a complete review of government cyber policies and
practices. The report was published several months later.' In
response to the findings and recommendations of the report,
President Obama stated that,
From now on, our digital infrastructure-the networks
and computers we depend on every day-will be treated
as they should be: as a strategic national asset. Protecting
this infrastructure will be a national security priority. We
will ensure that these networks are secure, trustworthy,
and resilient. We will deter, prevent, detect, and defend
against attacks and recover quickly from any disruptions
or damage.'
President Obama's expanded vision of what the focus of
Governmental concern should be is undoubtedly correct in that it
reflects the reality of today's national security threats. But even this
vision is mired in a parochial and anachronistic view of the
changing world and its impact on national security.
II. A CHANGING THREAT
The nature of the changing cyber threat is clearly
demonstrated by recent budget decisions in the United Kingdom.
During a time of significantly reduced budgets, the UK government
made some difficult decisions on the allocation of defense
resources. In a move that would shock most other nations, the
United Kingdom opted to forego the production of aircraft capable
aircraft carriers and allocate those resources to expanding and
1. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of
Attacks, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1533, 1555-63 (2010).
2. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLIcY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CyberspacePolicyReviewfinal.p
df.
3. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our
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maintaining its cyber defenses.
The significance of this decision cannot be overstated. There
are few pieces of military hardware that reflect the force projection
power of a nation more effectively than a fully capable aircraft
carrier. In a world where nations view other nations as the primary
threat to peace, fully capable aircraft carriers are among the top
priorities. Parking such a weapon off the coast of some recalcitrant
nation is a clear statement of military power. This is particularly
true for a country with a history of ocean dominance, such as the
UK.
But an aircraft carrier can do nothing to protect a nation from
the evolving national security threat of cyberattacks. The United
Kingdom's decision to forego the immense power provided by a
fully operational aircraft carrier in exchange for increased cyber
capability is an astounding statement of their view of future
national security threats and the actors who present them. It is no
longer states and full scale warfare that the United Kingdom views
as its dominant threat, but rather cyberattacks from not only other
nations but also from criminal business networks, transnational
terrorist organizations, citizen activist groups, flash mobs of like-
minded individuals across transnational borders, recreational
hackers, and individuals. These same threats exist for all other
nation-states, including the United States. For nations and their
leaders, including President Obama, this worldwide transition from
state-on-state armed conflict to state versus nonstate actors will have
a profound effect on national security, the law that governs it, and
processes that preserve it. Nowhere is this truer than in the area of
4. In an effort to maintain its force-projection capability, the UK found it
necessary to sign a defense pact with France, basically merging their aircraft
carrier capabilities where the UK and France would rely on each other's
capabilities when their own ship was in refit. See, e.g., Kim Sengupta, Jerome
Taylor & Michael Savage, Threat of Cyber Attack is the New Priority as Cuts Hit
Major Projects, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/threat-of-cyber-attack-is-the-new-
priority-as-cuts-hit-major-projects-2110273.html. As one commentator put it,
"[t]his compromises our operational integrity completely. If we need to send
a carrier to protect one of our territories, and ours is in refit, and the French say,
'Well, we don't agree - you're not using ours,' we're not going to be doing much
protecting." Daily Mail Reporter, Britain and France to Share Nuclear Secrets as
Cameron and Sarkozy Sign Historic 50-Year Military Agreement, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 2,
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cyber operations.
III. A CHANGING ENEMY
Cyber threats have existed since almost the inception of the
Internet. The first "attack" was the inadvertent Morris worm in
1988, written by a Cornell graduate student. Since that initial
attack that shut down the embryonic Internet, the World Wide Web
has become a rich source for cyber intrusions. U.S. Government
5
computers and networks are constantly being probed. In any
twenty-four-hour period, DOD computers access the Internet
"roughly seven million times"6 and "known cyberattacks [against
U.S. computers] rose to 37,258 [in 2008] from 4,095 in 2005.
Further, in a recent attack targeting "proprietary corporate data, e-
mails, credit-card transaction data and login credentials at
companies in the health and technology industries," more than
75,000 computers at over 2,500 businesses in 196 countries were
targeted." The pervasive nature of the Internet and the increased
capability it provides is accompanied by increased risks to nations
and users.
One could argue that these attacks are not national security
5. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report stated "the
Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Commerce; NASA; and
National Defense University all suffered major intrusions by unknown foreign
entities. The unclassified email of the secretary of defense was hacked, and DOD
officials told us that the department's computers are probed hundreds of
thousands of times each day. A senior official at the Department of State told us
the department had lost "terabytes" of information. Homeland Security suffered
break-ins in several of its divisions, including the Transportation Security Agency.
The Department of Commerce was forced to take the Bureau of Industry and
Security off-line for several months, and NASA has had to impose e-mail
restrictions before shuttle launches and allegedly has seen designs for new
launchers compromised." CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY: A REPORT OF THE CSIS COMMISSION
ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY, 12-13 (Dec. 2008), available at
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace-44.pdf.
6. Lieutenant Colonel Joshua E. Kastenberg, Changing the Paradigm ofInternet
Access from Government Information Systems: A Solution to the Need for the DoD to Take
Time-Sensitive Action on the NIPRNET, 64 A.F. L. REv. 175, 183 (2009).
7. Siobhan Gorman, Bush Looks to Beef Up Protection Against Cyberattacks, WALL
ST.J.,Jan. 28, 2008, at A8.
8. Ellen Nakashima, More Than 75,000 Computer Systems Hacked in one of the Largest
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threats involving the armed forces of a nation unless they come
from a peer nation-state. Looking to current international law, one
could further argue that these are criminal events that should be
handled by international criminal law through cooperative
investigation, extradition, and prosecution.9 However, the fatal
flaw in this argument was clearly demonstrated by the recent
Stuxnet malware.
Though still shrouded in much mystery, the Stuxnet malware
appears to be a highly sophisticated, precisely directed malware
that has had a significant effect on the emerging Iranian nuclear
capability. Because of its sophistication, many have concluded that
it was sponsored by a nation that had a reason to try and stop Iran's
nuclear program, most likely Israel. However, because of the
inherent problems with attribution in the cyber realm, it is still
unclear who is responsible for the malware. While many attribute
the attack to a nation-state, computer security giant Symantec
believes that such a cyber threat could be created by as few as five
to ten highly trained computer technicians in as little as six
months. 1
The Stuxnet malware demonstrates the possibility of a
debilitating cyberattack coming from any one of a broad range of
actors and triggers a new era in cyber conflict. The possibility that
six trained computer specialists, funded by some individual,
corporation, or organization, might create malware that is highly
lethal and capable of such discriminating effect further erodes the
idea that only states can initiate armed conflict. It has become
clear that national security threats requiring the full focus of the
armed forces of a nation no longer come from only nation-states.
9. The European Cybercrime Convention establishes a cooperative regime
for handling cybercrimes. See Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature
Nov. 23, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-11, Europ., T.S. No. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=1 85&CM=
8&DF=07/04/2011&CL=ENG. The Convention was adopted at the 109th session
of the European Council in November 2001. Though generated by the EU, the
Convention is open to both EU and non-EU member states. There are currently
twenty-nine EU member states and the US is the only non-EU member. However,
there are seventeen other states that have signed but not ratified. See
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF
=&CL=ENG.
10. Josh Halliday, STUXNET Worm is the 'Work of a National Government
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They now come from a full spectrum of sources, including cyber
threats originated by anyone, from an organized transnational
terrorist organization, to the highly trained individual hacker who
has an axe to grind against some government. A new era of threats
is emerging and will force the world to look at national security
from a different and expanded perspective.
One of the most obvious changes to our perception of national
security threats is the idea of who poses a threat. International law
is built on the foundation of state monopolization of violence that
emerged in the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia, where states
hired armies, navies, and police forces to not only control violence
within their borders, but to also carry out violence on behalf of the
sovereign without their borders. Under this paradigm,
international law granted privileges and duties to the state's
sovereign forces who served as agents for the state in conducting
and controlling violence." In the modern era of cyber warfare
(and other potential threats such as nuclear terrorism), this
paradigm's utility is severely diminished.
There is no doubt that cyber threats will continue to come
from individuals who meet the formal definition of "combatants"
under the law of war. Many nations have already participated in
cyber activities that were viewed as a national security threat, and
many others nations are trying to develop the capability to do so.
However, cyber actions just as threatening have come from non-
state groups, either in conjunction with armed conflict or outside
of it. Recent large-scale attacks in both Estonia in 200713 and
11. Combatants were granted prisoner-of-war status that resulted in treatment
guarantees that included immunity for warlike acts that complied with the law of
war. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 99,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
12. "In 2007, McAfee's annual Virtual Criminology Report concluded that
120 countries had, or were developing, cyber espionage or cyber war capabilities."
STEWART BAKER, SHAUN WATERMAN & GEORGE IVANOV, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 5 (2010), available at
http://csis.org/event/crossfire-critical-infrastructure-age-cyber-war (requires
registration). See also Ray Walser, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to
List, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Jan. 20, 2010, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-
time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list.
13. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in
Estonia, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html; Anne
Applebaum, For Estonia and NA TO, A New Kind of War, WASH. POST, May 22, 2007,
[Vol. 37:55054
6
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Georgia in 200814 illustrate the effectiveness of private groups with a
political agenda.
Clearly, President Obama cannot afford to view national
security threats as coming only from those who meet the legal
definition of combatants under current international law. Rather,
he must expand his view to a more holistic approach and be
prepared to respond with national power to threats that come from
any source.
IV. A CHANGING TARGET
In addition to expanding views of who may be a national
security threat, new considerations as to who or what may be
targeted in a cyber attack are also challenging traditional notions of
national security. Under the current UN paradigm, any "use of
force" is prohibited unless by consent of the target state, under
authorization of the UN Security Council, or in self-defense against
an armed attack or imminent armed attack. As the Stuxnet
malware demonstrates, these aggression-limiting ideals that were
created in the age of mechanized warfare have lost their ability to
govern activities in the modern cyber era.
When the UN Charter was under discussion, Brazil and others
argued that certain economic measures ought also to be proscribed
under illegal uses of force. This suggestion was not accepted and
"use of force" was narrowly understood as involving armed force.
Yet in today's world, surely a cyber operation that destroys
confidence in the stock markets of a nation should be seen as a
national security threat. In 1998, the United States recognized
stock markets and banking systems as critical infrastructure, along
at 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2007/05/21/AR2007052101436.html; Estonia: President Ilves's Speech on the
Occasion of International Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy Conference in Tallinn, US STATE
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.eesti.ca/?op=article&articleid=25139. The
attacks on Estonia prompted NATO to fund and create a new research center
designed to boost their cooperative defenses against cyberattacks.
14. Siobhan Gorman, Georgia States Computers Hit by Cyberattack, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 12, 2008, at 9; James R Asker, Cyber Zap, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Sept. 7, 2009; Brandon Griggs, U.S. at Risk of Cyberattacks, Experts Say, CNN (Aug.
18, 2008, 11:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH
/08/18/cyber.warfare/index.html; Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Sklerov,
Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active
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with telecommunications, energy, transportation, water systems,
and emergency services. These critical national infrastructures
are all potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks. Despite this
designation, nothing has been done to ensure meaningful security
for these critical infrastructures. And the costs of such attacks
continue to rise. According to Ty Sagalow, chairman of the
Internet Security Alliance board of directors, "[a]n estimated $1
trillion was lost in the United States in 2008 through cyber
attacks."' 6 This is more than the annual Gross Domestic Product of
all but the top sixteen countries in the world." The cost of
downtime alone from major attacks to critical national
infrastructure "exceeds ... $6 million per day."'
It is untenable to continue to reject the idea that this is a
national security threat. The loss of that much wealth each year has
profound implications for a nation with a national debt of over $14
trillion. The entire international community, but certainly the
United States, must adjust how it views an illegal "use of force,"
recognize that cyber attacks on economic and other similar targets
are a potentially debilitating use of force, and commit itself to
protection of these assets.
V. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
One of the key findings and recommendations of the report
concerned cooperation between the private and public sector. The
report argued:
The Federal government should work with the private
sector to define public-private partnership roles and
responsibilities for the defense of privately owned critical
infrastructure and key resources. The common defense
of privately-owned critical infrastructures from armed
attack or from physical intrusion or sabotage by foreign
military forces or international terrorists is a core
15. WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE NSC-63: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION pt. I (1998), available at http://www.fas.org
/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.
16. William Matthews, Cyber War's 'Front Lines' May Be in Private Hands, THE
AMERICAS, Dec. 7, 2009, at 38.
17. See CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library
/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001 rank.html (based on 2010
estimates) (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
18. BAKER, WATERMAN & IvANov, supra note 12, at 3.
5056 [Vol. 37:5
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responsibility of the Federal government.
Identifying the protection of critical infrastructures, including
banking and financial systems, from armed attack as a core
responsibility of the federal government is a significant realization
and should cause some reevaluation of the current approach to
cybersecurity. However, in connection with the public-private
partnership issue, President Obama stated,
Let me also be clear about what we will not do. Our
pursuit of cybersecurity will not-I repeat, will not
include-monitoring private sector networks or Internet
traffic. We will preserve and protect the personal privacy
and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans. Indeed, I
remain firmly committed to net neutrality so we can keep
the Internet as it should be-open and free.20
This statement by President Obama seems to assume that
"open and free" also means unsecure. That need not be the case;
indeed, it cannot be the case. In fact, keeping the Internet "4open"
is going to be more and more reliant on increased security
measures to maintain the functioning of the World Wide Web.
The government's current approach to public-private
partnership is very hands off. In fact, even amongst key defense
industries, "there are no regulatory requirements for conducting
formal risk assessments"' and executives of U.S. critical
infrastructure reported the "lowest levels" of government
regulation across fourteen countries surveyed." It appears that the
current public-private partnership means that the private sector
does what it wants and the government encourages and suggests
security measures but provides no regulation or oversight. Such a
system does not currently and will not continue to provide
sufficient security in this age of cyber threats.
It may not be necessary for President Obama to go as far as
Estonia and organize a Total Defense League of civilian specialists
who work in the private sector and come to the aid of the
19. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 2, at 28.
20. President Barack Obama, supra note 3.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY & DEP'T OF DEF., DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL
BASE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN AS INPUT
TO THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLANE 14 (May 2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-defense-industrial-base.pdf.
22. BAKER, WATERMAN & IVANOV, supra note 12, at 1.
2011] 5057
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government in times of cyber threat, but certain steps must be
taken to strengthen the national security. Since ninety-eight
percent of all government communications traverse over civilian
networks and systems, the civilian sector is bound up in national
security to a degree that cannot be ignored.
President Obama needs to give serious consideration to the
current public-private partnership and begin to assert more
regulation over security requirements in the private sector,
particularly those which support government operability and
critical national infrastructure. To accomplish this, the President
should ask Congress to legislate standards of cybersecurity common
to all of these private sectors with government oversight to ensure
the standards are met. Companies willing to abide by the new
standards should be free to do so, but for those companies who
cannot or do not, the government should have the authority to step
in and ensure the security of the networks from cyber threat.
Once the standards are in place, the government should create
"red teams" to exercise the security measures of the private sector
as they do now to the public sector in order to ensure security is
sufficient. The results of these exercises should be made public in
a "name-and-shame" effort to help the market drive increased
security if government regulation proves less than fully adequate.
Such steps are necessary to transform the current public-private
partnership from a failed attempt at cooperation into an aggressive
pillar of national cybersecurity.
VI. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
One of the other hallmarks of the U.S. Government's current
approach to national cyber security is the designation of the DHS
as the lead agency to combat cyber threats, with the DOD playing a
supporting role. Ignoring obvious problems with DHS's ability to
fulfill its responsibilities during the previous administration,
President Obama has continued to utilize this approach.
23. Tom Gjelten, Volunteer Cyber Army Emerges In Estonia, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/132634099/in-
estonia-volunteer-cyber-army-defends-nation.
24. Michael McConnell, Former Director on National Intelligence, currently
Executive Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton, Keynote Address at the
Conference on Law at the Intersection of National Security, Privacy and
Technology (Feb. 4, 2010).
5058 [Vol. 37:5
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In March of 2009, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) released a report on National Cybersecurity Strategy. The
report found that "DHS has yet to fully satisfy its cybersecurity
responsibilities designated by the [2003 National Strategy to Secure
,,25
Cyberspace].' DHS's inability to adequately respond to known
vital national security requirements during the past six years
demonstrates its similar incapacity to keep pace with the rapidly
changing nature of cyber threats. A recent memorandum of
agreement was signed between the DHS and the DOD to try and
26
increase coordination and cooperation between the two agencies,
but it is simply insufficient. President Obama rightly acknowledged
that cybersecurity is a key national security issue, but he has yet to
respond appropriately to this acknowledgement by assigning
responsibility to the agency with the current capability to handle
threats to cybersecurity, the DOD.
As has been previously discussed, the cyber threat is truly a
national security issue and though it threatens the homeland, it can
originate from anywhere in the world and defies national borders.
Assigning the overall responsibility for cybersecurity to DHS is
parochial and ineffective. Furthermore, it bifurcates activities and
responsibilities in a way that compromises the chance of success.
Instead, the DOD ought to be given the lead and allowed to use its
current assets such as the National Security Agency, Cyber
Command, and other agencies that are already heavily engaged in
cyber operations overseas to ensure that the cybersecurity umbrella
adequately protects all U.S. assets throughout the world. A recent
report from the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
agrees. The report states:
In addition, more than 80 percent of the Department's
logistics are transported by private companies; mission-
critical systems are designed, built, and often maintained
by our defense industrial base. The majority of our
military's requirements are not neatly bounded by the.mil
25. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-432T, NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY: KEY IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN THE
NATION'S POSTURE 4 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d09432t.pdf.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY & DEP'T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE
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(dot mil) domain; they rely on private sector networks
and capabilities. That is why the Panel believes it is vital that
the Department of Defense ensure the networks of our private
sector partners are secured.
Additionally, President Obama must ensure that the cyber
activities of the DOD and other government agencies are
adequately funded, that research is appropriately encouraged, and
that the government has aggressive recruiting and pay structures to
attract the very best minds in the area of national cyber security.
Some of these measures are in their embryonic stages, but more
must be done and done more quickly. U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense William Lynn recently wrote in Foreign Affairs:
The United States will lose its advantage in cyberspace if
that advantage is predicated on simply amassing trained
cyber professionals. The U.S. government, therefore,
must confront the cyber defense challenge as it confronts
other military challenges: with focus not on numbers but
on superior technology and productivity.8
Assigning the DOD as the single agency responsible for this
work and then adequately funding both personnel and research is
a vital step in the right direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The threat from cyberattacks is certainly among the most
important issues for American national security. The changing
nature of the threat, the enemy, and the targets make this an issue
of urgent and enduring importance. President Obama must focus
the full attention and powers of the government on this issue to
ensure the safety of the nation. Two important steps that will do
much to accomplish this task are the overhaul of the current
public-private partnership that he has made a key building block of
his cyber strategy and the reallocation of the primary governmental
responsibility for cyber security from the Department of Homeland
Security to the Department of Defense. The United States can
27. QUADRENNIAL DEF. REVIEW INDEP. PANEL, THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE:
MEETING AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURTY NEEDS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 62 (2010)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.usip.org/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf.
28. William J. Lynn, III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy,
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either act now with commitment and foresight, or wait to do so in
the aftermath of a potentially catastrophic cyberattack.
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